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Abstract—The synthesis of technology and the medical in-
dustry has partly contributed to the increasing interest in
Medical Cyber-Physical Systems (MCPS). While these systems
provide benefits to patients and professionals, they also introduce
new attack vectors for malicious actors (e.g. financially- and/or
criminally-motivated actors). A successful breach involving a
MCPS can impact patient data and system availability. The
complexity and operating requirements of a MCPS complicates
digital investigations. Coupling this information with the po-
tentially vast amounts of information that a MCPS produces
and/or has access to is generating discussions on, not only, how
to compromise these systems but, more importantly, how to
investigate these systems. The paper proposes the integration of
forensics principles and concepts into the design and development
of a MCPS to strengthen an organization’s investigative posture.
The framework sets the foundation for future research in the
refinement of specific solutions for MCPS investigations1.
Index Terms—Medical Cyber-Physical Systems, Forensics.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fusion of information technology into the medical
industry is creating opportunities and challenges for both prac-
titioners and academicians. As technology continues to evolve,
having up-to-date security and digital forensics capabilities
is becoming increasingly important to the medical industry
[1]. For example, in a hospital context, what were previously
being used as stand-alone medical devices are now being
designed with embedded software and integrated with network
interfaces [2], [3]. These network interfaces are used to
communicate with other devices during patient treatments and
healthcare systems that contain Electronic Health Records [2],
[4]. The integration of medical devices and healthcare sys-
tems is also referred to as a Medical Cyber-Physical System
(MCPS) in the literature [4], [5]. The implementation of a
MCPS is expected to present several benefits that include
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increased safety, decreased false alarms and reduce workloads
for medical professionals [6].
However, these benefits come with several developmental
challenges [3]–[5]. These challenges include a MCPS requir-
ing a new design, verification and validation techniques, inte-
grating interoperability, taking into account context-awareness,
addressing security and privacy concerns and ensuring the
MCPS can obtain safety certifications [3]–[5], [7], [8]. More-
over, unlike other safety-critical cyber-physical systems (e.g.
aircraft), which are evaluated for safety by regulators before
they are used [9], a MCPS is often assembled at the patient’s
bedside [2]. As a result, the devices that contribute to a MCPS
could realistically come from several vendors and that includes
a variety of makes and models that were not developed to
function together. These issues could result in additional attack
vectors and future device recalls by regulators [10].
To complicate matters further, a MCPS is likely to collect
and manage large amounts of medical data [11]. This will
predictably increase security and privacy concerns within the
healthcare community. A 2015 IBM report [12] states that
the healthcare industry is a high target industry. For example,
reported attacks in 2015 resulted in the exposure of nearly 100
million medical records and the full extent of the threat land-
scape is unknown due to under- or non-reporting of attacks and
cyber-security incidents [12]. Echoing this idea, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) predicts that healthcare systems
and medical devices are increasingly likely to become targets
for attackers in the future [13]. The same FBI press release also
emphasizes that the medical industry is not prepared to protect
against basic cyber attacks [13]. Similar observations have also
been made in more recent industry reports, indicating that most
healthcare organizations are not prepared to handle security
incidents and that only half of the surveyed organizations have
a security incident response plan in place [14], [15].
When a security incident occurs, organizations usually
respond by conducting an investigation to establish the root
cause of the incident and how it could be prevented in the
future [16]. In order to examine the causes of an incident,
investigators rely on the residual data from systems, affected
by the incident and supporting systems [17]. However, such
data might not always be available for a variety of reasons
that include short data retention times, a lack of extraction
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2capabilities and the costs associated with conducting such
investigations [18], [19]. As a result, incident handlers may not
be able to identify the causes of the security incident with any
degree of confidence [18]. Hence, there have been increasing
calls for organizations to implement forensic-ready systems
and infrastructure [20], [21]. Researchers have supported
forensic readiness efforts by proposing that organizations
implement policies and processes [20], align systems with
forensics objectives [22] and the training of employees [21].
In the past few years, researchers have proposed an alterna-
tive forensic readiness strategy called forensic-by-design [23]–
[25]. Conceptually, forensic-by-design is similar to security-
by-design, where requirements for forensics are integrated into
relevant phases of the system development lifecycle, with the
objective of developing forensic-ready systems [24], [26]. In
reality, a typical MCPS architecture could consist of different
layers and contain multiple types of devices that could lead
to several investigative issues. While there have only been a
handful of known security incidents involving cyber-physical
systems, a successful incident involving a MCPS could impact
both system availability and patient data. The consequences
of such incidents could, ultimately, result in the loss of life
or physical disability. While a forensic-by-design approach
will not stop a security incident from occurring, it can assist
investigators in the examination of malicious or criminal
activity involving a MCPS. For example, it can help with the
preservation of evidential data, the analysis of an incident to
determine root causes and accelerate the restoration of devices
and services affected with an incident.
This paper proposes, through a conceptual framework, the
integration of forensic-driven requirements into the MCPS de-
sign and development phases. The objective of this framework
is to design and develop a MCPS that is driven with digital
forensics in mind so that requirements for forensics are inte-
grated into relevant phases of the development process. The
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines challenges
associated with the design and development of a MCPS as well
as previous work in the forensic readiness domain. Sections 3
and 4 present the forensic-by-design framework and introduce
forensic readiness testing, an approach for verifying and
validating forensic-by-design approaches. Section 5 evaluates
the framework through a hypothetical case study and the last
section presents the conclusions and ideas for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Researchers are continuously demonstrating that devices
are at risk in a medical context [27]–[29]. Coupling these
activities with research indicating that there is increasing
interest in residual data in a general legal context [30], [31]
stimulates governmental, practitioner and academic interest
in appropriate regulatory issues and medical investigation
capabilities. However, a growing number of researchers are
arguing that, due to their size and complexity, relative to
traditional medical systems, medical cyber-physical systems
present several development challenges [2], [5], [10], [11],
[32]. The term Medical Cyber-Physical System (MCPS) is
defined as a “safety-critical, interconnected, intelligent system
of medical devices” [5].
Lee and Sokolsky [4] suggest that a MCPS integrates the
digital, physical and medical worlds and go on to argue that
the development of such systems introduces significant chal-
lenges for the information technology, medical and regulatory
communities. These challenges include deploying a MCPS so
that they can be integrated into custom clinical scenarios, using
model-based development approaches to assess patient safety
before deployment, incorporating verification and certification
early on in the development process, and finding the balance
between security and flexibility [4], [5]. King, et al. [2] add
that unlike most other safety-critical cyber-physical systems,
a MCPS is likely to be constructed at the patient’s bedside.
As a result, this can introduce additional safety challenges if
regulators will not know the brand, make or model of the
devices used in the particular MCPS instance [2]. Other re-
searchers have raised similar concerns. Sokolsky, et al. [3] add
that regulators could face several challenges when attempting
to approve modern medical devices that could form part of a
MCPS. The authors go on to state that communication within
a MCPS will not only introduce network failure concerns, but
will also introduce additional security and privacy concerns.
Venkatasubramanian, et al. [32] examined the security chal-
lenges and research direction in MCPSs, and indicated that
the interoperability of devices in a MCPS is creating a much
larger attack surface for malicious actors. They also pointed
out that MCPSs provide a unique set of security challenges
that are distinct from other types of cyber-physical systems.
Growing security concerns with medical devices has
prompted increased regulatory pressure to be applied to organi-
zations in the healthcare industry mandating security incident
handling capabilities, including forensic investigations [33].
Forensic investigations are often part of an organization’s
security incident response capability, with the aim of attempt-
ing to establish the six key questions of an incident: what,
why, who, when, where and how [34]. While the objective
of security incident response is to restore service and learn
about the causes of a security incident, digital forensics is
concerned with the collection and analysis of evidential data,
which can then be used as evidence in court [34]. Typically,
security incident handlers within an organization collect and
analyze potential evidential data after a security incident has
occurred. As a result, there are concerns that organizations
appear to be complacent with data activities prior to an
incident [20]. Hence, data that is required for an investigation
will either exist and is preserved by a system or it does not
exist and this can hinder an effective investigation [20]. These
concerns prompted suggestions that organizations need to be
more proactive, in reference to digital forensics, and structure
environments to retain data required for investigations [21].
This approach or stance is known as forensic readiness [21].
Previous forensic readiness research focused on the implemen-
tation of policies and processes, aligning systems with forensic
objectives and the impact and training of employees [20], [35].
Within the information security domain, researchers have
proposed forensics-based policies that can provide an orga-
nized structure within organizations [35]–[37]. Barske, et al.
[35] state that these policies should define how an organization
will monitor their systems, the conditions where data will
3be preserved for an investigation and the development of
policies that are needed to define when an investigation must
be undertaken. Supporting these suggestions, Rowlingson [20]
adds that policies should also define the identification of
evidential data sources and prompt the secure storage of any
data that could be required for an investigation. Like security
policies, Endicott-Popovsky, et al. [37] argue that policies
concerning forensic readiness should be regularly audited to
ensure continuous readiness.
While some researchers have proposed using policies, others
have argued that well-defined processes can enhance organi-
zational forensic readiness [21], [38], [39]. For example, sup-
porting investigators with a well-defined investigation process
can help reduce any mistakes during an investigation [39].
Similarly, the availability of data preservation and collection
processes can increase the speed of an investigation and
decrease the cost of reacquiring any compromised evidential
data [20]. Separately, other researchers have proposed that
organizations implement processes to guide log acquisition
along with specific extraction for investigations [21], [37].
However, there is minimal research addressing comprehensive
design considerations in terms of a MCPS.
III. FORENSIC-BY-DESIGN FRAMEWORK FOR MCPS
The forensic-by-design framework for a MCPS consists
of nine components as shown in Figure 1. The components
are presented as a black-box with the objective of designing
a forensic-ready MCPS that can assist developers in the
overall design and development process along with guiding
investigators in the examination of security incidents.
A. Risk Assessment
Organizations do not have infinite resources (e.g. financial
and manpower) and risk assessments are a key component
of an organization’s effort to identify threats and vulnera-
bilities that can affect systems and applications. Integrating
risk assessments into the design and development of a MCPS
provides two purposes. It can be used to identify risks that
are possible within a MCPS and prompt the implementation
of security controls to reduce this risk. However, residual
risk could persist and this, in turn, could result in security
incidents based on the threats and vulnerabilities. Therefore,
MCPS stakeholders can also use a risk assessment to identify
potential incidents that can occur within a MCPS environment
and then apply forensic readiness principles to these incidents
to support investigations, should an incident occur.
B. Forensic Readiness Principles
Forensic readiness focuses on an organization’s ability to
maximize the collection of evidential data, while minimizing
the cost of an investigation [20], [21]. This framework adopts
the following forensic readiness activities originally proposed
by Rowlingson [20]:
• Define the business scenarios that require digital
evidence. MCPS stakeholders need to identify the various
scenarios where digital evidence could be required based
on the results of the risk assessment. In a healthcare
context, MCPS stakeholders may also need to provide
evidence to demonstrate regulatory compliance and/or use
this information to prove the impact of an incident.
• Identify available sources and different types of po-
tential evidence. Kocabas, et al. [11] argue that a MCPS
architecture consists of four layers (data acquisition,
data concentration, cloud processing and action layers).
Therefore, evidence sources within a MCPS could include
wearable sensors, medical applications and devices in the
data acquisition layer; cloudlets and gateway servers in
the data concentration layer; public and private cloud
environments in the cloud processing layer and the out-
comes of activities taken in the action layer.
• Determine the evidence collection requirement. By
default, the various devices, applications, services and
systems that constitute a MCPS are, typically, not de-
signed with forensics in mind. Hence, strategies need to
be identified and implemented on how potential evidence
will be collected. For example, body-sensors are unlikely
to have the storage capacity to store event metadata from
the specific sensor. As a result, cloudlets or gateway
devices connected to the sensor need to collect and store
event metadata in a database which can then examined,
should the need arise.
• Establish a policy for secure storage and handling
of potential evidence. If evidential data collected from
a MCPS is to be used during an investigation, it needs
to be handled and stored correctly [40]. One solution
could involve the use of a centralized secure database
that can be used to store evidential data. Furthermore,
investigators tasked to investigate incidents in a MCPS
must follow evidence handling procedures that adhere to
digital forensics standards.
• Specify circumstances when escalation to a full formal
investigation should be launched. The complexity of
a MCPS could inevitably make it difficult to identify
when a suspicious event has occurred. However, when a
suspicious event has been identified, an organization will
need to make use of an incident response taxonomy so
that it can ‘grade’ the severity or impact of the event [41].
The outcome of this ‘grading’ taxonomy provides an
indication as to organization’s need to escalate to a full
incident response investigation.
• Train staff in incident awareness, so that all those
involved understand their role in the digital evi-
dence process and the legal sensitivities of evidence.
Grispos, et al. [42] and Christopher, et al. [43] identified
that there are opportunities to improve security incident
awareness and reporting practices within organizations.
With a magnitude of potential stakeholders involved in a
MCPS, similar opportunities could exist in MCPS con-
texts. Furthermore, organizations need to define practices
and policies that can be used in a MCPS that will promote
an environment that is conducive to protecting evidential
data, particularly, when this data could be used in court.
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Fig. 1. MCPS forensic-by-design framework
C. Security Requirements
When stakeholders establish that a system provides some
value to an organization, they will attempt to protect this
system from harm by expressing security requirements during
its development [44]. From a forensic-by-design perspective, a
failure to correctly implement these requirements could result
in the need to conduct a forensic investigation. However,
investigation findings and knowledge gained from responding
to security incidents could also be used to delineate better
security requirements in the context of a MCPS. The various
applications, devices and systems that constitute a MCPS
will, in all likelihood, require different security requirements.
Therefore, obtaining a better understanding of the security
requirements needed for this complex interconnected system
will improve protection initiatives for a MCPS.
D. Privacy Requirements
Sensors and devices within a MCPS, potentially, collect
highly sensitive information. For example, some sensors
within a MCPS could act as ‘lab-on-a-chip’ and can detect
the presence of medical drugs, record temperatures and collect
bio-markers [45]. These sensors and devices require stake-
holders to take into consideration a special set of privacy-
preserving requirements. For instance, private patient informa-
tion generated from general use of a MCPS could be exposed
to forensic investigators examining a security incident involv-
ing a malicious actor. Privacy concerns indicate that designing
a forensic-driven MCPS will likely require acknowledgement
that privacy requirements may conflict with forensic strategies.
E. Relevant Legislation
Mission-critical software, such as a MCPS, often needs to
be designed to comply with a variety of laws [46]. Therefore,
the design of a forensic strategy for a MCPS needs to take
into consideration relevant healthcare legislation that impacts
the system. The system also needs to ensure that it takes into
consideration privacy legislation for individuals interfacing
with the system. These will differ from country to country.
An example of this issue is visible in through data protection
legislation in the UK and the US. UK legislation is very
stringent when compared to the, overall, US legislation on the
topic. Existing legislation in different countries will also im-
pact evidential collection, storage and processing which could
perceivably impact MCPS stakeholders. With the integration
of cloud storage capabilities into healthcare environments,
it is conceivable that healthcare data could be acquired in
one country and legitimately processed in another country.
When a forensic investigation needs to take place in this
scenario, conflicts could arise in terms of data protection, data
acquisition and retention. Hence, relevant legislation in these
areas will need to be taken into consideration.
F. Relevant Regulations
In addition to considering relevant laws, healthcare regu-
lations and standards should also be considered. Healthcare
regulations influence the monitoring, collection and storage of
potential evidential data that is collected from a MCPS. For
example, Section 164.308 of the ‘Security Rule’ part of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
of 1996 [47] specifically requires organizations to “implement
policies and procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct
security violations” [48]. The Security Rule also indicates that
digital evidence is preserved and that organizations document
incidents that occur as well as their outcomes [48].
G. Medical Requirements
Understanding the interaction between a medical device and
its various medical environments is crucial within a MCPS. For
the purpose of this discussion, medical requirements describe
the requirements that need to be satisfied in order for an
application, device or system to have a medical purpose. These
requirements drive the development of a device’s functionality
like being able to push insulin to a patient from an infusion
pump. It is worth noting that diverse medical requirements
for MCPS components could conflict with a forensic-driven
MCPS development approach. For example, in the event of an
incident or breach, medical requirements will likely demand
5that a component delivers its medical functionality. However,
this could conflict with the preservation and collection of
evidential data. Hence, stakeholders need to first identify the
medical requirements for a MCPS and then perform a trade-off
analysis between medical requirements with forensics-related
requirements that support forensic readiness.
H. Safety Requirements
Interconnected medical devices that can form part of a
MCPS need to be designed and validated with patient safety
in mind [4]. The inclusion of forensic strategies into the
development of a MCPS could introduce additional safety
challenges. This is because many of the existing forensic
strategies and incident response process focus on investigations
involving office-based systems and provide minimal support
for investigations involving safety-critical system such as a
MCPS [33]. For example, traditional approaches advocate
the shutting down of systems and preservation of evidence
contained in device memory. However, shutting down a safety-
critical application may be impossible (e.g. a fusion pump or
pacemaker) to collect potential evidential metadata. Therefore,
MCPS stakeholders need to take into consideration safety
requirements when designing and developing the forensic
strategy that will be integrated into the design of their MCPS,
as well as considering other alternatives such as live forensic
acquisition techniques.
I. Software and Hardware Requirements
A MCPS will likely contain a variety of different appli-
cations, devices and systems, all running different hardware
configurations and software developed by different vendors.
The reliance between these various components within a
MCPS inevitably complicates the preservation and collection
of evidential data. As noted in Section III-B, potential eviden-
tial data could exist in various layers of a MCPS architecture.
Therefore, understanding the various hardware and software
requirements that will emerge from each layer supports the
identification, preservation and collection of data that could
be used in a forensic investigation. For example, if a mobile
device is used as a gateway between a monitoring sensor and a
cloud storage facility, a forensic investigator needs to identify
potential evidence that can be extracted from the mobile
device. This perceivably includes addressing the challenges
of collecting evidence from a cloud computing environment.
IV. FORENSIC-READINESS TESTING
After a prototype MCPS has been designed and developed
using a forensic-driven approach, it is critical to test and
confirm the forensic principles that have been integrated into
the relevant phases. Effectively, testing and validating forensic
capabilities provides MCPS stakeholders with information
about the ability to conduct investigations in a MCPS envi-
ronment. Furthermore, several researchers have argued that
an effective software verification process is critical for the
certification of medical device software [2]–[5]. However,
there is no current standard for testing, validating and verifying
forensic-by-design software and systems. Hence, the following
activities are proposed as a starting point for addressing
this deficiency within a MCPS forensic-driven development
approach. These include:
• Verifying that evidential data is created within a MCPS
and that this evidential data satisfies the various business
scenarios that could require digital evidence. Further-
more, any evidential data that is created and stored within
a MCPS satisfies legal, regulatory and industry demands
and other requirements (e.g. safety requirements).
• Ensuring that potential evidence can be preserved and col-
lected both reliably and compliant with digital forensics
standards. This includes evaluating security incident and
evidence handling procedures to ensure that they adhere
to digital forensics standards.
• Ensuring that various components of a MCPS are ‘foren-
sically sound’ and do not contaminate, modify or delete
any evidential data that could be used in a forensic
investigation of a MCPS.
• Performing a safety, security and privacy requirements
check against the MCPS to ensure that they have been
satisfied. Moreover, any risks and trade-offs between
these requirements and those related to forensics have
been sufficiently acknowledged and/or mitigated.
In the US, to submit digital evidence into a court it must
be both reliable and relevant [19]. The reliability of digital
evidence is tested by applying the Daubert standard [49]. The
Daubert standard proposes four queries to assess the reliability
of digital evidence:
• Can and has the procedure used to acquire the data been
tested?
• Is there a known error rate for this procedure?
• Has the procedure been published and subject to peer-
review?
• Does the relevant community accept the procedure as an
approach for acquiring the data?
These four queries from the Daubert standard could serve as
an additional approach to validating and verifying forensic-by-
design software. A viable approach to utilizing these queries
is to develop assurance or test cases that will help answer
the above questions. In this scenario, software testers, security
incident response personnel and forensic investigators could
write test cases to determine error rates for evidence acquisi-
tion procedures. This would likely involve preloading a known
data set into a MCPS and then using a forensic tool to acquire
the data from the MCPS. After analyzing the acquired data,
the number of recovered files can be compared to the known
data set and the differences used to establish error rates of the
procedure and the tool with the device in various states.
Any problems that emerge during testing, validation and
verification will involve refining some of the requirements
presented in Section III and then re-testing associated factors.
After testing, a MCPS should be forensic-ready based on the
requirements defined in the previous sections.
V. HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDY
A plausible case study example would be an integrated
fusion pump. In this scenario, a scanner would be used to
6Design and Development Potential Actions
Risk Assessment Undertake a risk assessment to identify, assess, evaluate and prioritize threats and vulnerabilities that could impact
the MCPS. For example, a risk involving a man-in-the-middle attack could be identified in the network connection
between the BCMA and the fusion pump. Such a risk would be classified as high-priority because such an attack
could increase or decrease the functionality presented by the fusion pump.
Forensic Readiness Information identified from the risk assessment can be used to drive the forensic readiness practices in this phase.
For example, after identifying that a man-in-the-middle attack is possible (a business scenario that could require
evidential data), stakeholders need to identify what sources of evidence can exist as well as what type of evidence
is needed to investigate the incident. This involves examining all the layers within the MCPS architecture, along
with the network communication layer.
In addition, evidence and incident handling best practices concerning this type of evidence (e.g. network-based
evidence) must be identified and incident handlers should be trained on how to preserve, collect and store this
evidence according to relevant standards.
Security Requirements Using the risk assessment, stakeholders can express what security requirements are needed to protect the MCPS
from harm. In addition, stakeholders can consider the domain knowledge to identify information from investigations
of previous similar threats and propose better security requirements for the context of the MCPS.
Privacy Requirements The interactions between the fusion pump and the BCMA generate medical data that is then transferred to relevant
hospital systems. As a result, privacy requirements need to be identified to ensure that a forensic investigation
(e.g. to investigate the man-in-the-middle incident) does not expose private patient information when attempting
to identify the malicious actor or actors involved in the incident. This could mean that data is anonymized to the
point that the forensic investigator does not recognize the patient using the fusion pump.
Relevant Legislation Privacy legislation needs to be followed when designing and examining interactions in the MCPS. In the
UK, relevant privacy legislation that would need to be considered from a compliance perceptive is the Data
Protection Act and, in the US, data privacy is addressed, to a large extent, in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
Relevant Regulations Investigations need to ensure that they are compliant with regulations. In the current scenario, if an investigation
revealed that there were problems with the pump or a connected device, then these issues would need to be
reported, in compliance with mandatory or voluntary regulations, to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
for United States based institutions.
Medical Requirements The requirements that focus on pump operations like a pump continuing or discontinuing an infusion, for a specific
patient, based on the information gathered from the interaction between the BCMA and the hospital systems is a
vital medical requirement. However, these requirements also need to be considered from a forensics perspective.
For example, the date and time the infusion pump was started/stopped, as well as where the command to initiate
this action came from could be useful information to a forensic investigator.
Safety Requirements A safety analysis needs to be undertaken to identify, depending on the type of infusion pump and the medication
being dispersed, whether it is safe to conduct a forensic investigation whilst the pump is still providing a medical
function to a patient. The results of this analysis would then determine if the pump is powered on or off before
a forensic investigation can take place. Furthermore, stakeholders may need to consider the impact on evidential
metadata should the pump be turned off, as this could erase temporary information of value.
Software & Hardware Requirements Interoperability between the various MCPS hardware and software components is evident in the case study
example. From a forensics perspective, stakeholders need to understand what protocols are in use between the
BCMA and the hospital system as well as how the software components have been designed and their impact on
evidence preservation and collection.
TABLE I
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ACTIONS
scan a patient’s identification. This information would then
be transferred to the fusion pump. The pump conceivably
has a network connection to utilize a Bar Coded Medication
Administration (BCMA) control system [50]. The idea behind
a BCMA is to validate medication distribution with existing
orders for specific patients [50]. Once, this has been validated,
the infusion is initiated by a medical professional or by the
pump itself. The medical data generated from this interaction
is then transferred to relevant hospital systems for analysis by
the next shift of medical professionals, pharmaceutical inven-
tory systems, billing systems, general reporting systems and
archival systems. A sample implementation of the conceptual
forensic-by-design framework is presented in Table I.
Each of the systems that are involved in this example
would need to be examined from the perspective of the nine
design and development phases. Once these phases have been
completed, the system in its entirety would need to pass
forensic-readiness testing. Once this has been completed, a
document would be produced certifying that specific MCPS
configuration from a forensic readiness perspective. If the
configuration changes, the process would need to be repeated
for re-certification.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As cyber-physical systems continue to integrate into medical
environments, the need for forensic investigations will con-
tinue to escalate. The forensic-by-design framework presented
in this paper provides a starting point for conversations,
research and solutions that could be used to address this issue.
Future work will endeavor to develop practical solutions that
will address specific technical and procedural implementations
of the nine design and development stages identified in the
conceptual framework in a MCPS context. In addition, the
solution(s) should ideally be implemented and evaluated using
a test-bed at a hospital setting so that the solution(s) can be
refined, if necessary.
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